Abstract. Boneh and Venkatesan have recently proposed a polynomial time algorithm for recovering a "hidden" element α of a finite field IFp of p elements from rather short strings of the most significant bits of the remainder modulo p of αt for several values of t selected uniformly at random from IF * p . We use some recent bounds of exponential sums to generalize this algorithm to the case when t is selected from a quite small subgroup of IF * p . Namely, our results apply to subgroups of size at least p 1/3+ε for all primes p and to subgroups of size at least p ε for almost all primes p, for any fixed ε > 0. We also use this generalization to improve (and correct) one of the statements of the aforementioned work about the computational security of the most significant bits of the Diffie-Hellman key.
Introduction
Let p be an n-bit prime and let g ∈ IF p be an element of multiplicative order T , where IF p is the finite field of p elements.
For integers s and m ≥ 1 we denote by (s rem m) the remainder of s on division by m. We also use log z to denote the binary logarithm of z > 0.
In the case of T = p − 1, that is, when g is a primitive root, Boneh and Venkatesan [2] have proposed a method of recovering a "hidden" element α ∈ IF p from about n 1/2 most significant bits of (αg xi rem p), i = 1, . . . , d, for d = 2n
1/2 integers x 1 , . . . , x d , chosen uniformly and independently at random in the interval [0, p − 2]. This result has been applied to proving security of reasonably small portions of bits of private keys of several cryptosystems. In particular, in Theorem 2 of [2] the security of the n 1/2 + ⌈log n⌉ most significant bits of the private key g ab rem p of the Diffie-Hellman cryptosystem with public keys (g a rem p) and g b rem p with a, b ∈ [0, p − 2] is considered. Namely, a method has been given to recover, in polynomial time, the DiffieHellman key g ab rem p from (g a rem p) and g b rem p , using an oracle which gives only the n 1/2 + ⌈log n⌉ most significant bits of the Diffie-Hellman key. Unfortunately the proof of Theorem 2 in [2] is not quite correct. Indeed, in order to apply Theorem 1 of that paper to h = g b this element must be a primitive root of IF p . Thus the proof of Theorem 2 of [2] is valid only if gcd(b, p − 1) = 1 (of course the same result holds in the case gcd(a, p−1) = 1 as well). However, even in the most favourable case when l = (p−1)/2 is prime, only 75% of pairs (a, b) satisfy this condition. Certainly breaking a cryptosystem in 75% of the cases is already bad enough (even in 0.75% is) but unfortunately for the attacker (using the above oracle), these weak cases can easily be described and avoided by the communicating parties. The proof of Theorem 3 of [2] suffers from a similar problem.
Here we use new bounds of exponential sums from [7] to extend some results of [2] to the case of elements g of arbitrary multiplicative order T , provided that T ≥ p 1/3+ε . This allows us to prove that the statement of Theorem 2 of [2] holds for all pairs (a, b). We also prove that for almost all primes p similar results hold already for T ≥ p ε . A survey of similar results for other functions of cryptographic interest has recently been given in [5] .
Throughout the paper the implied constants in symbols 'O' may occasionally, where obvious, depend on the small positive parameter ε and are absolute otherwise; they all are effective and can be explicitly evaluated.
Distribution of g x Modulo p
For integers λ, r and h let us denote by N λ,g,p (r, h) the number of x ∈ [0, T − 1] for which (λg x rem p) ∈ [r + 1, r + h]. We need the following asymptotic formula which shows that N λ,g,p (r, h) is close to its expected value T h/p, provided that T is of larger order than p 1/3 .
Lemma 2.1. For any ε > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that for any element g ∈ IF p of multiplicative order T ≥ p 1/3+ε the bound
Proof. We remark that N λ,g,p (r, h) is the number of solutions x ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1} of the congruence λg x ≡ y (mod p), y = r + 1, . . . , r + h.
Using the identity (see Exercise 11.a in Chapter 3 of [17] )
we obtain
Separating the term T h/p corresponding to c = 0 we obtain
exp (2πicy/p) .
We estimate the sum over x by using the bound max gcd(c,p)=1
where
which is essentially Theorem 3.4 of [7] . Using the estimate max 0≤r,h≤p−1 
It is easy to see that for any ε > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that B(T, p) = O(T 1−2δ ) for T ≥ p 1/3+ε and the result follows.
⊓ ⊔
In the next statement we show that for almost all primes the lower bound T ≥ p 1/3+ε can be brought down to T ≥ p ε .
Lemma 2.2. Let Q be a sufficiently large integer. For any ε > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that for all primes p ∈ [Q, 2Q], except at most Q 5/6+ε of them, and any element g ∈ IF p of multiplicative order T ≥ p ε the bound
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 2.1 using in this case Theorem 5.5 of [7] instead of (1) and (2). For each prime p ≡ 1 (mod T ) we fix an element g p,T of multiplicative order T . Then Theorem 5.5 of [7] claims that for any U > 1 and any integer ν ≥ 2, for all primes p ≡ 1 (mod T ) except at most O(U/ log U ) of them, the bound max gcd(c,p)=1
holds. We remark that the value of the above exponential sum does not depend on the particular choice of the element g p,T . Taking
after simple computation we obtain that there exists some δ > 0, depending only on ε, such that for any fixed T ≥ Q ε/2 the bound max gcd(c,p)=1
holds for all except
As it follows from (1) and (2), a similar bound also holds for T ≥ Q 1/3+ε/2 . So the total number of exceptional primes p for which (3) does not hold for at least one
. Using the bound (3) in the same way as we have used (1) and (2) in the proof of Lemma 2.1 we derive the desired result.
⊓ ⊔ Certainly in both Lemma 1 and Lemma 3 the dependence of δ on ε can be made explicit (as a linear function of ε).
Lattices
As in [2] , our results rely on rounding techniques in lattices. We therefore review a few related results and definitions.
Let {b 1 , . . . , b s } be a set of linearly independent vectors in IR s . The set of vectors
In [1] Babai describes a polynomial time algorithm which, for given a lattice L and a vector r = (r 1 , . . . , r s ) ∈ IR s , finds a lattice vector v = (v 1 , . . . , v s ) satisfying the inequality
That is, a given vector can be rounded in polynomial time to an approximately closest vector in a given lattice. The above algorithm uses the lattice basis reduction algorithm of Lenstra, Lenstra and Lovász [9] , see also [14] for some more recent and stronger results.
, we denote by L g,p (x 1 , . . . , x d ) the d + 1-dimensional lattice generated by the rows of the follow-
The following result is a generalization of Theorem 5 of [2] (which corresponds to the case T = p − 1).
. For any ε > 0, sufficiently large p, and any element g ∈ IF p of multiplicative order T ≥ p 1/3+ε the following statement holds. Choose integers x 1 , . . . , x d uniformly and independently at random in the interval [0, T − 1]. Then with probability
with some β ≡ α (mod p).
Proof. As in [2] we define the modular distance between two integers β and γ as
Let x be an integer chosen uniformly at random in the interval [0, T − 1]. It follows from Lemma 2.1 that for any β and γ with β ≡ γ (mod p) the probability
for an integer x chosen uniformly at random in the interval [0, T − 1] is
for some δ > 0, depending only on ε. Hence
Therefore, for any β ≡ α (mod p),
, where probability is taken over integers x 1 , . . . , x d chosen uniformly and independently at random in the interval [0, T
The rest of the proof is identical to the proof of Theorem 5 of [2], we outline it for the sake of completeness.
Let us fix some integers
Let v be a lattice point satisfying
where, as in (4), t i = (g xi rem p), i = 1, . . . , d. If β ≡ α (mod p), then for all i = 1, . . . , d we have βt i − z i p = (βt i rem p), for otherwise there would be j ∈ {1, . . . , d} so that |v j − u j | > p2 −µ . Now suppose that β ≡ α (mod p). In this case we have
that contradicts to our assumption. As we have seen, the condition (5) holds with probability exceeding 1 − 2 −n 1/2 and the result follows.
⊓ ⊔
For an integer k ≥ 1 we define f k (t) by the inequalities
Thus, roughly speaking, f k (t) is the integer defined by the k most significant bits of (t rem p). Using Lemma 3.1 in the same way as Theorem 5 is used in the proof of Theorem 1 of [2] we obtain Lemma 3.2. Let d = 2 n 1/2 and k = n 1/2 + ⌈log n⌉. For any ε > 0, sufficiently large p and any element g ∈ IF p of multiplicative order T ≥ p 1/3+ε , there exists a deterministic polynomial time algorithm A such that for any integer α ∈ [1, p − 1] given 2d integers t i = (g xi rem p) and
its output satisfies 
, and r d+1 = 0.
Multiplying the last row vector (t 1 , . . . , t d , 1/p) of the matrix (4) by α and subtracting certain multiples of p-vectors, we obtain a lattice point
Now we can use the Babai algorithm [1] to find in polynomial time a lattice vector
where µ = n 1/2 /2 + 3, provided that n is sufficiently large. We also have
Applying Lemma 3.1, we see that v = u α with probability at least 1 − 2 −n 1/2 , and therefore, α can be recovered in polynomial time.
⊓ ⊔ Accordingly, using Lemma 2.2 instead of Lemma 2.1, in a similar way we obtain that for almost all primes much smaller values of T can be considered. Lemma 3.3. Let Q be a sufficiently large integer. For any ε > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that for all primes p ∈ [Q, 2Q], except at most Q 5/6+ε of them, and any element g ∈ IF p of multiplicative order T ≥ p ε there exists a deterministic polynomial time algorithm A such that for any integer α ∈ [1, p − 1] given 2d integers 
Security of the Most Significant Bits of the Diffie-Hellman Key
We are ready to prove the main results. For each integer k define the oracle O k as an 'black box' which given the values of A = (g a rem p) and B = (g b rem p) outputs the value of f k (g xy ). Using the bound τ (T ) = O T ε/3 , see Theorem 5.2 of Chapter 1 of [13] , we obtain that the probability of gcd(b + r, T )
In the opposite case, when gcd(a + r, T ) ≤ T p −1/3−ε/3 , the multiplicative order of g r is
Now we use the oracle O k with (g x A rem p) and (g r B rem p) to compute f k (α r g • Selects a random r ∈ [0, T − 1].
• Applies algorithm A from Lemma 3.2 (now g r plays the role of g in the conditions of Lemma 3.2. This algorithm makes O n 1/2 calls to the oracle O k .
• Outputs the correct value α r with probability at least 1
Indeed, the only possible source of error is either the case T r ≤ p 1/3+ε/3 or the probability error of the algorithm of Lemma 3.2. The probability of both events is
we obtain the desired result.
⊓ ⊔
It is easy to see that Theorem 4.1 is nontrivial for any T ≥ p 1/3+ε . In a similar way, Lemma 3.2 produces a result which holds for almost all primes p and is non-trivial for T ≥ p ε . 
Remarks
First of all we note that the constants in above estimates are effective and can be explicitly evaluated. It would be very interesting to replace the condition T ≥ p ε for the smallest size of the multiplicative order of g in Lemma 2.2 by a weaker condition of the form T ≥ (log p) c with some constant c. Although a more careful analysis of the proof of Theorem 5.5 of [7] should allow to replace p ε with a slower growing function, it seems unlikely that the present method can be applied to T as small as a power of log p.
Our results can also be applied to several other cryptosystems based on exponentiation in finite fields, which have been considered in [2] , except the Shamir message passing scheme, see [2, 3] (this scheme is also described in Protocol 12.22 in [11] ). Unfortunately the proof of Theorem 3 in [2] suffers from the same problem as the proof of Theorem 2 of that paper. Namely, for the ElGamal scheme, see [2, 3] as well as Section 8.4 from [11] , it produces a result which applies only to at most 50% of the cases and it cannot be applied to the the Shamir message passing scheme at all. Indeed, in this scheme the exponent x of the corresponding multiplier g x must satisfy the additional condition gcd(bx + 1, p − 1) = 1, with some b, gcd(b, p − 1) = 1, thus g x runs through some special subset of IF * p (even if g is a primitive root) rather than through the whole IF * p and thus Theorem 1 of [2] does not apply. Our results in their present form cannot be used for this problem directly, however it has been shown in [6] that a modification of the technique of this paper, combined with some elementary sieve method produce similar results for the Shamir message passing scheme.
Besides the mentioned in [2, 3] cryptosystems several other schemes can be studied as well. For example, very similar results hold for the MatsumotoTakachima-Imai key-agreement protocol, see Section 12.6 of [11] .
The results of [3] can be generalized in a similar way. To do so one can use the bound of exponential sums of Theorem 3.4 of [7] to study the distribution of the sums (g x1 + . . . + g xr rem p) and thus obtain an analogue of Lemma 2.4 of [3] . One can also extend Theorem 4.1 to the case of Diffie-Hellman encryption modulo an arbitrary composite integer m ≥ 2. Indeed, using the well-known bound (1) and (2), one can obtain similar results for elements g, gcd(g, m) = 1, of multiplicative order T modulo m such that T ≥ m 1/2+ε . In fact, Lemma 3.2 can be extended to elements t i chosen uniformly and independently at random from any subgroup G of the group of units modulo m, provided that the cardinality of G satisfies #G ≥ m 1/2+ε . As we have mentioned, similar but somewhat more involved technique can be applied to studying the bit security of the Shamir message passing scheme, see [6] .
Finally, we remark that somewhat similar problem for extensions of finite fields have been considered in [16] . The results of that paper and some of their improvements in [15] have applications to the security of the new cryptosystem designed in [4, 10] .
